Responsibility In The Processes Of Innovation
The Bassetti Foundation in Milan Italy has been working for more than a decade to promote the idea of responsibility in innovation. The debate has included issues of definition, goals and aims, the role of politics, innovation as politics and the role of technology and innovation in society today. One of the first ideas that comes to mind when we talk about innovation is technology, although innovation is obviously not bound to its use.
The first thing to do therefore is to open a debate into definition. What for example is ‘technology’?
Mario Bunge (Bunge, 1976) defines technology as ‘ a body of knowledge that is compatible with science and demonstrable through scientific methodology, that can be used to control, transform or create natural or social things or processes for any practical, useful use’. Richard Nelson (Nelson, 2006) describes it as ‘composed of a body of techniques and practices and by a body of theoretical or practical notions, results of the co-evolution of technical and scientific understanding’.
Foundation president Piero Bassetti prefers the definition of those who see technology as the incarnation of the ways by which a theoretical understanding becomes concrete and as such usable for something, and therefore as an action. An action because a ‘technologist’ allows a particular understanding (theoretical or technical, new or old) to be put into practice, and therefore used by the person that transforms it into products or processes. From this point of view technology can be clearly seen as the thing that contributes to the process of knowledge by transforming it from theoretical to practical.
Thus defined, technology can be seen as delimited within its true role as a vehicle for the transformation of knowledge from scientific to operative, but also as an indispensable instrument for the creation of ‘prototype’, if not yet ‘production’ models.
And what about innovation, how does the use of technology become innovative? We know in fact that the injection of an additional quantity of power and capital is necessary for (even technologically complete) knowledge to be transformed into the production of innovative objects or processes with their added value. The introduction of this added value is the work of a third party, the industrialist or entrepreneur, or the person that is able to combine scientific and technological factors with the other ‘production factors’ – capital, workforce and organization – necessary to arrive at a result that is economically and socially relevant.
And here we bring in the problem of responsibility, because without bearing the above in mind the question of responsibility cannot be raised, or will be incorrectly framed. It is difficult to imagine that a simple transformation of knowledge implies the taking of responsibility if it is without practical application because it is not finalized through ‘the realization of the improbable’ that the innovation process requires. The ‘realization of the improbable’ is the working definition that we use at the Bassetti Foundation for innovation. Innovation is not just seen as discovery, or invention as the following shall hope to demonstrate.
Innovation is not only determined however by an additional quantity or quality of scientific-technological knowledge. It requires that the ‘additional quantity of knowledge’ is joined by an ‘additional quantity of power’ for which different forms of knowledge, such as those tied to the management of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ – whose management is the specific responsibility of the industrialist – are equally necessary. New scientific and technological knowledge can provide impetus for the creation of something that is objectively relevant – new products or new services – and bring to life that which was previously unknown or non-realized, but only if real capital and power are directed towards the goal of realizing the improbable. In other words to realize the improbable is not the same thing as to discover.
On the other hand not all things produced using new technology can be described as innovations in a true sense. A lot of products and processes derived from the use of new technologies refer to already existing uses and practices. And actors of different types of knowledge transformation – researchers, technicians and industrialists or entrepreneurs – cannot always be seen as distinct elements, as each can take on different or multiple roles.
The organization of concepts and roles described above allows us to say that because technology is not ‘neutral in the sense that it can be applied to every chosen proposal and produce non neutral collateral effects’, responsibility cannot be ascribed to the technologist herself ‘tel quel’. Responsibility taking will vary according to modes of execution, uses and product type, but also to the subjective position of its operator, i.e. according to the distribution of roles that the productive system under discussion involves.
Moreover, the concept of responsibility, especially within its relationship to ethics, can never be seen without thinking about complexity. This not only touches upon the difficulty involved in ascribing responsibility to different subjects involved, but also to the criteria that those who are concretely held responsible should be aware of and follow.
Regarding this argument Hans Jonas (Jonas, 1984) acutely states that ‘all ethics (being) a question of responsibility for the future consequences of a present action’ and ‘modern technology (an instrument that) is able to influence future conditions in a way that is difficult to predict, we must air on the side of caution if we want to avoid a mistake’. Here we face the old sociological problem of our inability to see into the future. We may produce something, an incredible advancement in scientific and social culture, but once the genie is out of the bottle we completely lose control, as novel applications for our innovative product are discovered.
Examples are everywhere, some arguably positive, such as the production of energy from nuclear power, others may be less so. The sequencing of the human genome may be seen as a great leap forward, possibly allowing us to develop new medicines and treatment forms ad persona, but when your children are asked for a sample of DNA before the insurance company grants them life or medical cover we may begin to see it in a different light. All things potentially have many unforeseen uses.
And this leads us on to the transfer of knowledge and techniques. The truth is that it is difficult to schematize processes of knowledge transfer and it is not always easy to define the responsibility that derives from these transformations. The technologist that adds technological understanding to scientific knowledge and therefore contributes to making an innovation possible cannot be ascribed the same level of responsibility as someone who by adding power to knowledge is the real actor of the innovation in question. It is one thing to supply an extra quantity of knowledge to generate innovation, but another to provide the power necessary to implement its creation. The responsibility that Fermi, Oppenheimer, and Truman hold for the production of the bomb is not equal.
On the other hand, and above all in the field of the modern organization of scientific institutions in which the scientist becomes both the technician and industrialist of herself, the figure of the person that transforms knowledge or technology is often superimposed upon that of whoever provides the will and power needed for the innovation whose effects are the interest of responsibility. All this said, the differences in quantity and quality of responsibility involved remain and cannot be ignored. If we take the example of a multinational company that has its seat in the US, produces in 13 different countries and employs researchers all over the world, where do you start if you want to address the argument of responsibility. If there is an industrial accident, or a product causes health problems, or is discovered to be incredibly useful at something that it was not designed to do, who is responsible?
A recent post on the Bassetti foundation website included the transcription of an interview with Congressman Michael E. Capuano. Congressman Capuano is an interesting subject because he represents probably the largest concentration of scientists and researchers in the world. His territory hosts MIT, Harvard University and the University of Boston to name just 3 of the more than 30 research institutions currently present.
Boston University has built an as yet unopened high security biodefense lab after winning a tender with the government, but who should take responsibility in the case of an accident. Here we have various categories of people, technicians, builders, designers, decision makers, politicians, regulating authorities and forces of nature, to name just a few. And history shows us that when problems arise, it is very difficult to pin legal responsibility upon an individual or group of individuals, because so many people are involved.
A conclusion seems therefore deductible: the abstract ascription of responsibility to the technology or the science itself surely has little sense. Specific ascription to the scientist, the technologist or the industrialist could however have sense, based upon the way in which each of these people have participated in determining the productive phenomena that provoke consequences that can be judged in terms of responsibility.
image credit: usf.edu
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